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INTRODUCTION

The balancing of freedom of speech and the protection of personal
reputation has been the subject of litigation for many years. The law of
defamation of public figures was finally settled by the United States Supreme
Court in 1964 with its landmark holding in New York Times v. Sullivan.1
In New York Times, Justice Brennan held that public officials could recover
for defamation only upon showing that their defamers knew or should have
known that their statements were false.2 This standard has been upheld for
over thirty years. Recently, however, the ruling in New York Times has been
questioned and rejected abroad, by courts in both Australia 3 and South
Africa.4
Part II of this note begins by discussing the current status of public figure
defamation law in the United States. Part III discusses Australian defamation
law with respect to the Australian case, Theophanous v. The Herald &
Weekly Times Ltd.5 Part IV discusses the 1996 South African case Holomisa
v. Argus Newspapers Ltd.6 Part V of this note examines the logic of the
foreign cases and the possible impact these cases may have on United States
public official defamation law. The note concludes by suggesting that
because of the unreasonable assumptions made in the foreign cases and the

*
**

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Editor'snote: This note was selected as the best note for Fall 1996.
This note is dedicated to my mother, father, sister, and brother.
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) [hereinafter New York Times 1].
Id. at 279-80.
Theophanous v. The Herald & Weekly Times Ltd. (1994) 182 C.L.R. 104 (Austl.).
Holomisa v. Argus Newspapers Ltd. 1996 (2) SALR 588 (Sup. Ct., WLD) (S. Afr.).
(1994) 182 C.L.R. at 104.
1996 (2) SALR at 588.
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inadequate protection of free speech provided under the decisions of the
foreign cases, these recent rulings will have little if any impact on U.S.
defamation law.
II.

UNITED STATES DEFAMATION LAW

Under common law in the United States, defamation was a tort of strict
liability. 7 Courts held publishers liable even when they had acted reasonably
This standard was
or innocently in publishing the defamatory material
changed by the 1964 U.S. Supreme Court ruling in the landmark case, New
York Times.9 In New York Times, Justice Brennan put forth what is now the
standard applied to defamation of public figures.' 0 L.B. Sullivan, an elected
Commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama," brought a civil libel suit against
the New York Times Company, a New York corporation that publishes the
New York Times (Times), a daily newspaper.' Sullivan alleged that certain
statements contained in a full-page advertisement in the Times on March 29,
1960 were libelous against him. 3 The purpose of the advertisement was to
solicit funds for the "support of the student movement, 'the struggle for the
right-to-vote,' and the legal defense of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., leader of
the movement, against a perjury indictment."' 4 The advertisement stated:
"'As the whole world knows by now, thousands of Southern Negro students
are engaged in widespread non-violent demonstrations in positive affirmation
of the right to live in human dignity as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution
and the Bill of Rights.' "'s It further alleged that the students "'[we]re
being met by an unprecedented wave of terror by those who would deny and
negate that document which the whole world looks upon as setting the
pattern for modem freedom.' ,16
Sullivan based his libel claims specifically on the contents of two of the
ten paragraphs of the advertisement. 17 Paragraph three stated:

7. Ortiz v. Valdescastilla, 478 N.Y.S.2d 895, 895 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
8. Triangle Publications, Inc. v.Chumley, 317 S.E.2d 534, 536 (Ga. 1984) (holding that
"[t]he standard of care under which [a] publisher who defames private figure may
constitutionally be held liable in tort is one of ordinary care").
9. New York Times I, 376 U.S. at 267.
10. Id. at 254.
11. Id. at 256.
12. Id. Sullivan also brought suit against four African American clergyman from
Alabama. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 257.
15. Id. at 256 (quoting Heed Their Rising Voices, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1960, at L23).
16. Id. (quoting Heed Their Rising Voices, supra note 15).
17. Id. at 257.
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"In Montgomery, Alabama, after students sang 'My Country,
'Tis of Thee' on the State Capitol steps, their leaders were expelled
from school, and truckloads of police armed with shotguns and teargas ringed the Alabama State College Campus. When the entire
student body protested to state authorities by refusing to re-register,
their dining hall was padlocked in an attempt to starve them into
submission.' '
The sixth paragraph stated:
"Again and again the Southern violators have answered Dr.
King's peaceful protests with intimidation and violence. They have
bombed his home almost killing his wife and child. They have
assaulted his person. They have arrested him seven times - for
'speeding,' 'loitering,' and similar 'offenses.' And now they have
charged him with 'perjury' - a felony under which they could
imprison him for ten years....
Sullivan alleged that because he was the Montgomery Commissioner who
supervised the Police Department, readers would interpret the word "police"
in the advertisement to mean that he had been responsible for "ringing" the
campus with police.2 ° Sullivan further contended that readers would impute
responsibility to him for padlocking the dining hall in an attempt "to starve
the students into submission."'"
Sullivan also claimed that the sixth
paragraph would be read as accusing the Montgomery police, and therefore
him, of intimidation and violence against Dr. King, and of bombing Dr.
King's home, assaulting Dr. King, and charging Dr. King with perjury.2 2
The Times, including the advertisement, was circulated in Alabama.23
The Times Advertising Acceptability Department took the order for the
advertisement from a New York advertising agency, which was acting for the
signatory Committee.24 The order was accompanied by a letter 25 certifying

18. Id. (quoting Heed Their Rising Voices, supra note 15, at L23).
19. Id. at 257-58 (quoting Heed Their Rising Voices, supra note 15, at L23).

20. Id. at 258.
21. Id.
22. Id. ("Respondent and six other Montgomery residents testified that they read some or
all of the statements as referring to him in his capacity as Commissioner.").
23. Total circulation for the Times that day was approximately 650,000 copies - 394
copies were circulated in Alabama with approximately 35 of these copies circulated in
Montgomery County. Id. at 260 n. 3.
24. Id. at 260.
25. Id. The letter was from A. Philip Randolph, Chairman of the Committee, who "was
known to the Times' Advertising Acceptability Department as a responsible person." Id.
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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that the individuals listed in the advertisement had given their permission.26
The manager of the Advertising Acceptability Department testified at trial
that it was the established practice of the Department to accept such letters
as proof of authorization.27 No one at the Times made any attempt to check
the accuracy of the statements that were contained in the advertisement.28
Under Alabama law as it existed at the time of trial, a public officer
could not recover punitive damages in a libel suit based upon a publication
concerning his official conduct unless he first made a written demand for a
public retraction, and the defendant failed or refused to comply.29 Sullivan
made such a written demand of the Times, the Times wrote to Sullivan
concerning his demand, but it did not print a retraction.3 ° Sullivan filed suit
a few days after receiving the letter from the Times.3'
At the trial level, Sullivan was awarded $500,000 in damages for the
libel.32 The case was appealed, and the Alabama Supreme Court, relying
on Alabama case law, held that "[w]here the words published tend to injure
a person libeled by them in his reputation, profession, trade or business, or
charge him with an indictable offense, or tends to bring the individual into
public contempt[,] . . . [they are] libelous per se."33 The court further held:
Where words are libelous per se and as heretofore stated we
think the published words in the present case were libelous per se,
the right to damages results as a consequence, because there is a
tendency of such libel to injure the person libeled in his reputation,
profession, trade, or business, and proof of such pecuniary injury is
not required, such injury being implied.34
In reply to the Times' argument that the advertisement was protected by
the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,35 the court merely stated:

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

New York Times 1, 376 U.S. at 260.
Id.
Id. at 261.
Id.
Id. The Times sent Sullivan a letter stating, "'[W]e

. .

. are somewhat puzzled as to

how you think the statements in any way reflect on you.... [I]f you desire, let us know in
what respect you claim that the statements in the advertisement reflect on you.'" Id.
31. Id.

32. New York Times v. Sullivan, 144 So. 2d 25, 28 (Ala. 1962) [hereinafter New York
Times II].
33. Id. at 37 (citing White v. Birmingham Post Co., 172 So. 649 (1937); Iron Age Pub'g
Co. v. Crudup, 5 So. 332 (1889)).

34. Id. at 49 (citing Webb v. Gray, 62 So. 194 (Ala. 1913); Advertiser Co. v. Jones, 53
So. 759 (Ala. 1910)) (emphasis added).
35. The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridgingthe freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol10/iss2/5
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"The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution does not protect libelous
publications., 36 Additionally, the court reasoned that "the Fourteenth
Amendment is directed against State action and not private action. 37
On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Brennan quickly disposed
of the lower court's ruling on the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Brennan
reasoned that even though this was a civil action between two private parties,
the U.S. Constitution applies because "the Alabama courts have applied a
state rule of law which... [the Times] claim[s] to impose invalid restrictions
on their constitutional freedoms of speech and press., 38 Brennan further
stated that the form in which the state power had been applied was
inconsequential. 39 Brennan's sole concern was that the power had been
exercised. 0
Once the Court decided that the U.S. Constitution applied to Sullivan's
action, it proceeded to determine whether the Alabama common law of
libel, 41 "as applied to an action brought by a public official against critics
of his official conduct, abridges the freedom of speech and of the press that
is guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments."4' 2 In making this

Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
36. New York Times II, 144 So. 2d at 40 (citing Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S.
36, 36 (1961) (holding that a state bar applicant's refusal to answer any question having
substantial relevance to his qualifications could be grounds for a denial of a license); Times
Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 43 (1961) (holding that those who wish to exhibit
films do not have an absolute privilege against prior restraint); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343
U.S. 250, 250 (1952) (holding that libelous statements that defame groups are not protected);
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (holding that" 'fighting words' those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace" were among the classes of speech that were not protected by the First Amendment); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 698 (1931) (holding that the proper remedy for false
accusations against public officials was by postpublication libel action, not by prepublication
procedures).
37. New York Times II, 144 So. 2d at 40 (citing Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651
(195 1)). The Fourteenth Amendment states, in part: "No state shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States ...." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
38. New York Times 1, 376 U.S. at 265. Furthermore, the First Amendment protection of
free speech applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
39. New York Times I, 376 U.S. at 265 (stating that "[iut matters not that ...[the] law
has been applied in a civil action and that it is common law only").
40. Id. (citing Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1879); American Fed'n of Labor
v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941)).
41. See Johnson Publ'g Co. v. Davis, 124 So. 2d 441, 457-58 (Ala. 1960) (holding
publisher libel for statements regarding a teacher); Alabama Ride Co. v. Vance, 178 So. 438,
438 (Ala. 1938) (holding city commission not libel for publication of petition that was
"substantially true"); Parsons v. Age-Herald Publ'g Co., 61 So. 345, 350 (Ala. 1913) (holding
newspaper not libel for "fair and accurate" report, "published in good faith to inform the
public . . . though the report [may] contain matter that is false, defamatory, and injurious").
42. New York Times I, 376 U.S. at 268.
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determination, the Court began by noting that previous decisions of the Court
had settled the question of whether the First Amendment protected freedom
of expression upon public questions.43 Justice Brennan pointed to several
prior decisions of the Court that upheld the importance of free, unrestrained,
open debate on public issues.' The Court also recognized that the founders
of our nation enacted the First Amendment because they were concerned with
the tyrannies of a governing majority. The Court noted that the founders
believed that the best way to protect the governed was to allow the
"'opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies.'""'
Against this backdrop, the Court concluded that the imes
advertisement was entitled to First Amendment protection.4 6 This, the Court
said, was because "the present advertisement, as an expression of grievance
and protest on one of the major public issues of our time, would seem clearly
to qualify for the constitutional protection."4' 7
Having determined that the advertisement was protected by the
Constitution, the Court then turned to the question of whether the advertisement forfeited such protection because it was defamatory and contained false
factual statements.4" In deciding whether the advertisement was excluded
from First Amendment protection because of the false factual statements it
contained, the Court once again turned to some of its prior decisions.4 9 The
Court noted that "[a]uthoritative interpretations of the First Amendment
guarantees have consistently refused to recognize an exception for any test
of truth - whether administered by judges, juries, or administrative officials
- and especially one that puts the burden of proof on the speaker."'
As
policy underlying these past decisions, the Court stated that "erroneous
statement[s] [are] . .. inevitable in free debate, and.., must be protected if
the freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need
...to survive.' ,
However, it further stated that the allowance of such

43. New York Times I, 376 U.S. at 269.
44. Id. at 269-70 (citing on N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (stating "[the First Amendment] was fashioned to
assure unfettered interchange of ideas"); Bridges v. California., 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941)
(stating "it is a prized American privilege to speak one's mind.., on all public institutions");
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 37576 (1927); United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)).
45. New York Times I, 376 U.S. at 270 (quoting Justice Brandeis' concurring opinion in
Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375-76).
46. Id. at 270-71.
47. Id. at 271.

48. Id.
49. Id. at 271-72.
50. Id. at 271.
51. Id. at 271-72 (quoting N.A.A.C.P., 371 U.S. at 433).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol10/iss2/5
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statements was a small price to pay for democracy.5 2
Turning to the issue of whether the defamatory nature of the advertisement warranted its repression, the Court looked to cases involving judges
who had allegedly been defamed. 3 Justice Brennan noted that these cases
held that criticism of judges and their decisions could not be restricted, even
if the criticism contained false information.5 4 He reasoned that if such
protection is afforded to critics of judges, it surely must also extend to critics,
like the Times, of elected city commissioners. 5
Having examined the case law of defamation and the policies underlying
the adoption of the First Amendment, the Court enunciated the standard on
defamation of public officials in the United States as it stands today. 6 The
Court stated:
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule
that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves
that the statement was made with "actual malice" - that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not. 7
This standard is commonly referred to as the "actual malice" standard. The
Court further held that the Alabama law that "presumed" malice as to general

52. Id. at 271-72 (citing N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963); Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940)).
The Court gave particular deference to the opinion of Judge Edgerton in Sweeney v. Patterson,
128 F.2d 457, 458 (1942), cert. denied 317 U.S. 678 (D.C. Cir. 1942). Judge Edgerton stated:
Cases which impose liability for erroneous reports of the political conduct of
officials reflect the obsolete doctrine that the governed must not criticize their
governors.. .. The interest of the public here outweighs the interest of appellant
or any other individual. The protection of the public requires not merely discussion,
but information. Political conduct and views which some respectable people
approve, and others condemn, are constantly imputed to Congressmen. Errors of
fact, particularly in regard to a man's mental states and processes, are inevitable.
... Whatever is added to the field of libel is taken from the field of free debate.
Id.
53. New York Times 1, 376 U.S. at 272-73 (citing Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962);
Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 342, 343 n.5, 345
(1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941)).
54. Id. (citing Bridges, 314 U.S. at 252).
55. Id. at 273 (stating that "[c]riticism of their official conduct does not lose its
constitutional protection merely because it is effective criticism and hence diminishes their
official reputations").
56. Id. at 279-80.
57. Id.
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damages was also violative of and inconsistent with the Constitution."
Concluding that the Alabama law was unconstitutional as written, the Court
reversed and remanded the case.5 9 Although the "actual malice" standard,
and the decision as a whole, has been criticized and examined for many
years, it has stood as good law until the present with very little refinement. 60
III. AUSTRALIAN DEFAMATION LAW
Courts in other jurisdictions recently have criticized Justice Brennan's
standard in New York imes. In the Australian case Theophanous v. The
Herald & Weekly imes Ltd.,61 three of the five Justices explicitly rejected
the holding in New York imes.
In Theophanous, the defendant published a letter that allegedly defamed
Dr. Andrew Theophanous. 62 Dr. Theophanous had been a member of the
House of Representatives since 1980.63 At the time of the alleged defamation, he was the chairperson of the Joint Parliamentary Standing Committee
on Migration Regulations as well as the Chairperson of the Australian Labor
Party's Federal Caucus Immigration Committee.' On November 8, 1992,
defendant, The Herald & Weekly Times Ltd. published a letter to the editor
in its newspaper The Sunday Herald Sun (Herald) entitled, "Give
Theophanous the Shove. 65 The letter contained the following allegedly
defamatory statements:
If reports coming out of Canberra are true about the alleged
behavior of Dr. Andrew Theophanous, then it is high time he was

58. New York Times I, 376 U.S. at 283-84. The Court stated that" '[t]he power to create
presumptions is not a means of escape from constitutional restrictions.'" Id. at 284 (quoting
Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 239 (1944)).
59. Id. at 292. The Court went on to find that "the evidence against the Times
support[ed] at most a finding of negligence in failing to discover the misstatements, and [wa]s
constitutionally insufficient to show the recklessness that [wa]s required for a finding of actual
malice." Id. at 287-88. The Court also found that the jury's finding that the statements were
made " 'of and concerning'" Sullivan was not supported by the evidence. Id. at 288.
60. Commentators have said that one of the problems in applying the New York Times
standard is that it is difficult for courts to determine just who is a "public figure." For an
interesting and thorough discussion of subsequent cases that have addressed the "public figure"
aspect of the New York Times decision, see Erik Walker, Comment, Defamation Law: Public
Figures - Who Are They?, 45 BAYLOR L. REv. 955 (1993).
61. (1994) 182 C.L.R. at 104.
62. Id. at 117-18.
63. Id. at 117.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 117-18. The letter had been written by a second defendant, Mr. Bruce Ruxton,

who at the time of publication was the President of the Victorian branch of the Returned and
Services League. Id.
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thrown off Parliament's immigration committee.
I have read reports that he stands for most things Australians are
against.
He appears to want a bias shown towards Greeks as immigrants.
Let me say at the outset that the Greeks who have come to this
country have been a splendid example to everyone. They are hard
working, honest, delightful people, and they would agree with me,
I'm sure, that right now too many immigrants are being allowed in.
There are just no jobs for newcomers - or those who already
live here.
It has been reported that Dr. Theophanous wants the British base
of Australian society diluted so that English would cease to be the
major language.
What is this man on about? And what language would he
suggest we use to replace English?
I'm grateful there's an election in the wind. I hope the people
of Calwell give Dr. Theophanous the heave.
Poor old Arthur Calwell must be spinning in his grave at the
idiotic antics of the man in the seat named after him.
Calwell was a great Australian and the architect of this country's
post-war immigration policy.66
Dr. Theophanous brought an action for defamation against the defendants
in the County Court of Victoria.67 He alleged that the letter implied that he
"showed a bias towards Greeks as migrants; ... stood for things that most
Australians were against; . . . [and] was an idiot and his actions were the
antics of an idiotic man., 68 As a defense, the Herald asserted that under the
Commonwealth Constitution, there was a freedom to publish material
(i) in the course of discussion of government and political matters;
(ii) of and concerning members of the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia which relates to the performance by such
members of their duties as members of the Parliament or parliamentary committees; [and] (iii) in relation to the suitability of persons for
office as members of Parliament.69
The Heraldfurther asserted that the publication was not actionable because
it was made

66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 118.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 119.
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without malice;... [was] reasonable in the circumstances;... [was]
not made without an honest belief in the truth of the words or made
with reckless disregard for the truth or untruth of the words; made
at a time when it was publicly anticipated that a federal election was
about to be called.70
In deciding whether the Commonwealth Constitution provided an implied
freedom of discussion of government and political matters, the Theophanous
Court concluded that to guarantee the efficacy of representative democracy,
an implied freedom of discussion must extend to the protection of political
discussion.7" Having decided that an implied freedom of discussion did
indeed exist under the Commonwealth Constitution, the High Court
proceeded to determine the criteria under which an action for defamation was
not actionable.72
In examining the "actual malice" standard of the New York Times,73 the
court held that a publication is not actionable unless it is made with
knowledge of falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth or falsity,74 the
High Court noted that the standard afforded some protection to the reputation
of the public official and a large amount of protection to the publisher.75
The High Court also examined several criticisms of the New York Times
standard. Chief Justice Mason pointed out that the New York Times standard
does not place enough emphasis on the reputation of the person defamed.7 s
He also noted the criticism that the rule places too much emphasis on free
speech at the expense of individual reputation.7 7 Chief Justice Mason stated
that this emphasis would be more misplaced if the court were to adopt the
New York Times standard because of the difference between cost rules and
procedures of the United States and Australia." Referring to points made
by the New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Chief Justice Mason
recognized several problems defendants have experienced under the New
York Times standard.79 Defendants have suffered intrusive discovery
procedures as a result of the plaintiff's attempts to prove malice; the
protracted litigation has inflated costs and damages; and the protection of

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 119.
Id. at 130.
Id. at 133.
New York Times 1, 376 U.S. at 254.
Id. at 280.
Theophanous, (1994) 182 C.L.R. at 134.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 134-35.
Id. at 135.
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sources has been threatened. 0
Deciding not to adopt the New York Times standard in Australia, the
High Court held that New York Times did not provide adequate protection to
reputation.8 ' It reasoned that the standard placed too heavy a burden of
proof on the public official because the official would have to prove that the
statement was made with actual malice, 2 and that the protection of free
communication did not require a "subordination of the protection of
individual reputation as appears to have occurred in the United States. ' ' 3
As a better rule, Chief Justice Mason held that "if a defendant publishes false
and defamatory matter about a plaintiff, the defendant should be liable in
damages unless it can establish that it was unaware of the falsity, that it did
not publish recklessly, . . . and that the publication was reasonable."'
Chief Justice Mason stated that here "reasonable" means that the publisher
either took "some steps to check the accuracy of the impugned material or
...establish[ed] that it was otherwise justified in publishing without taking
such steps or steps which were adequate." 5
The appropriateness of the New York Times standard to defamation of
Australian public officials also was addressed by Justice Brennan of the
Theophanous court.8 6 In response to the Herald's argument that New York
Times supported the position that there was a freedom to publish founded on
the Commonwealth Constitution, Brennan stated that cases decided based on
constitutions of foreign countries provided extremely limited assistance.87
Furthermore, this was due to the fact that they frequently contained
provisions that are not present in Australia's Commonwealth Constitution. 8
Brennan specifically pointed to the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which he viewed as expressly creating or being construed as expressly
creating, a provision for freedom of communication, which has no counterpart in the Commonwealth Constitution. 9
Justice Brennan further noted a difference between the history of the
United States preceding its adoption of the First and Fourteenth amendments

80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 135-36.
83. Id. at 136.
84. Id. at 137.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 141. In Theophanous, the High Court of Australia was comprised of seven
Justices: Mason, C.J.; Brennan, J.; Deane, J.; Dawson, J.; Toohey, J.; Gaudron, J.; and
McHugh, J. Id. at 104.
87. Id. at 157.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 157-58 & n.68 (noting that section 2 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms provides for freedom of expression, and that Article 10, clause 1.1 of the European
Convention on Human Rights expressly grants a similar right).
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to the U.S. Constitution and that of Australia preceding the adoption of the
Commonwealth Constitution.90 Brennan noted that Australia's Constitution
has neither a Bill of Rights nor a First Amendment,9' and that in fact, the
Melbourne Convention, held in 1898 to draft the Australian Constitution,
rejected the adoption of a provision similar to section one of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.92
Brennan stated that the New York Times standard, which places the
burden on the plaintiff, demonstrated the major difference between the legal
cultures of the two countries. 3 According to Brennan, the purpose behind
New York Times standard is to define the conditions under which the
protection of the constitutional privilege is lost. 94 Whereas, the purpose of
Australian defamation law is to "protect personal reputation to an extent
appropriate in a society which also values free speech., 95 Brennan thus
concluded that the ruling in New York Times has no persuasive influence on
the interpretation of the Commonwealth Constitution.96
Justice Deane of the Theophanous court also considered the issue of
whether the New York Times standard should be adopted in Australia. 97 He
initially noted the benefit of adopting a standard such as that enunciated in
New York Times because it would protect the citizens from being punished
for expressing "honest and well founded criticism. '98 However, citizens
still would be protected if a different standard were adopted because of the
difficulties of "proof and the inherent uncertainty of all litigation." 99 Deane
stated that a major shortcoming of the New York Times standard was that it
required the plaintiff to prove truth or malice in defamation actions would
probably do little to eliminate any "chilling" effect on speech."° This was
because the decreased likelihood of defamation proceedings under a standard
like New York Times would be counterbalanced to a significant extent by the
increased costs and mental probing the defendant would suffer as result of
the plaintiff's attempts to prove falsity and malice.' 0 ' Because the defendant could be subject to financial ruin even if he or she spoke the truth,

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 159.
Theopanous, (1994) 182 C.L.R. at 159.
Id. at 160 n.86.
Id. at 160.
Id. at 160-61.
Id. at 161.
Id.
Id. at 185-87.
Id. at 185.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Deane concluded that freedom of speech seemed to be no real freedom at
02
all.1
IV. SOUTH AFRICAN DEFAMATION LAW

A recent case outside of the United States that considered the adoption
of the New York limes standard was decided in South Africa in February
1996. Before examining the South African case, however, it is important to
comment on the recent history of that county's constitution. The final draft
of the South African Constitution was adopted on May 8, 1996.'03 The
new Constitution is unique in South African history in that it explicitly
provides for the protection and enforcement of fundamental rights.' 4
Against this background, the recent South African rejection of the New York
imes standard becomes very interesting.
In Holomisa v. Argus Newspapers Ltd.,10 5 the plaintiff was allegedly
defamed by an article published in the defendant's newspaper. At the time
of the alleged defamation, the plaintiff was the military ruler of Transkei, a
so-called homeland created by the pretransition government in furtherance of
its ideology of apartheid.' °6 On May 27, 1993, defendant's newspaper, the
Johannesburg Star printed
an article titled "Holomisa Is Linked to Infiltration
10 7
of Apla Hit Squad."'
The article contained several statements that Holomisa considered to be
defamatory 0 8 It claimed that Holomisa had been "directly involved" in
an infiltration into South Africa by the Azanian People's Liberation Army
(Apla) and the Transkei Defense Force squad.'0 9 The article further stated
that the purpose of the infiltration was to kill whites in the northern Natal
region and to assassinate a top South African official in Transkei." The

102. Id. In conclusion, Justice Deane agreed with Chief Justice Mason and Justices Toohey
and Gaudron that "an unqualified application of the defamation laws of Victoria to impose
liability in damages in respect of political communications and discussion is precluded by the
constitutional implication of political communication and discussion." Id. at 187. Justice
Deane disagreed with the three Justices about the condition upon the defendant to prove an
absence of recklessness or reasonableness. Id. at 188. However, he agreed that the implied
freedom of communication implicit in the Commonwealth Constitution precluded liability for
defamation based upon the facts of this case and thus, lent his support to the decision of the
others. Id.
103. Jefri Jay Ruchti, Republic of South Africa, in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF
THE WORLD at ix (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., Supp. 1996). The new Constitution will come fully
into operation at the time of the next scheduled national elections on April 30, 1999. Id.
104. S.AFR. CONST. ch. 2, §§ 7-39 (Bill of Rights) (1996).
105. 1996 (2) SALR 588 (Sup. Ct. WLD) (S. Aft.).
106. Id. at 593.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 593-94.
109. Id. at 593.
110. Id.
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Star contended that the article was based on military intelligence sources."'
Plaintiff filed suit in August 1994, alleging damages for defamation."'
Plaintiff claimed that the article would be understood to mean that he had
participated in acts aimed at the killing of white people and had been
involved in a conspiracy to murder a South African official." 3 The
plaintiff's claim pleaded that the article was "'false and defamatory of the
plaintiff' and that the defendant published it 'wrongfully and unlawfully and
with the intention to defame the plaintiff and damage him in his reputation. 1114
The defendant excepted to plaintiff's pleadings, alleging a failure of legal
competency." 5 The Star alleged that criticism of public officials was
protected under section 15(1) of the 1993 Interim Constitution." 6 Apparently attempting to incorporate the rule enunciated in New York imes into
South African common law under the new Constitution, the Star asserted that
a public official who attempts to recover damages for defamation must first
prove that the defendant had "'(1) [a]ctual knowledge that the matter
published was in fact false; alternatively,(2) [had] publi[shed] ...the matter
with reckless disregard as to whether it was false or not.' "117 "According
to the exception, the plaintiff's failure to make these averments rendered his
particulars of claim fatally defective."'" 8 The Star's exception placed the
propriety of the New York imes standard squarely before the court.
In addressing the Star's exceptions, the Holomisa court first had to
decide the issue of whether the Constitution applied to the dispute between
the two parties. 1"'
The Holomisa court concluded that the Interim
Constitution's Chapter on Fundamental Rights was "intended to apply in
some manner to all disputes between litigating parties."'' 20 The court
specifically noted that section 35(3), "which obliges a court to 'have due
regard' in interpreting any law and in applying and developing the common-

111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 594.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. (citing Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993, Interim Constitution, § 15(1));
see Jefri Jay Ruchti, Republic of South Africa, in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD at 12 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., Supp. 1995). The new Constitution states: "Everyone
has the right to freedom of expressions, which includes - (a) freedom of the press and other
media; (b) freedom to receive and impart information and ideas; (c) freedom of artistic
creativity; and (d) academic freedom and freedom of scientific research." S. AFR. CONST.
§ 16(1) (1996); see Ruchti, supra note 103, at 12.
117. Holomisa, 1996 (2) SALR at 594.
118. Id.
-119. Id. at 596.
120. Id. at 597.
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law, 'to the spirit, purport and objects' of the fundamental rights chapter,
becomes not merely an interpretative directive, but a force that informs all
legal institutions and decisions with the new power of constitutional
values."'' Based upon this section, the court concluded that "it would be
improper to consider the defences available to the defendant in a defamation
action [before them] without taking into account, as between defendant and
plaintiff, the fact that s[ection] 15(1) guarantees every person 'the right to
freedom of speech and expression.' ,,1
Having concluded that the Constitution applied in the instant case, the
Holomisa court turned its attention to the Star ' constitutional arguments.' 23
After a survey of the common law of South Africa, the court concluded that
in order to escape liability for a defamatory publication under the current
state of the defamation law, the defendant had to prove the truth of the
statements contained therein.'
The court stated that if the court were
bound only by the common law, the decision in Neethling would be
binding.'25 However, the court held the decision in Neethling predated the
Constitution, and current South African courts were bound
to take into
126
account the Constitution's fundamental rights provisions.
In determining what standard was called for by the Constitution in
defamation cases, the Holomisa court considered the New York Times
standard. 127 It put forth several reasons for its decision not to follow New
York Times. 28 First was the difference between the United States and
South Africa in the size of defamation awards. 12 9 The Holomisa court
stated that the reason the New York imes court imposed such a heavy
burden on the plaintiff was because the State was using defamation actions
to "'transform the traditional libel action, designed to repair the reputation
121. Id. at 598 (quoting Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993, Interim Constitution,
§ 35(3)); see Ruchti, supra note 115, at 22.
122. Holomisa, 1996 (2) SALR at 598 (quoting Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993,
Interim Constitution, § 15(1)); see Ruchti, supra note 115, at 12.
123. Holomisa, 1996 (2) SALR at 598.
124. Id. at 603 (relying on Neethling v. Du Preez, 1994 (1) SALR 708 (A) (S. Aft.)).
"The matter stands rather differently in regard to the defence of truth in the public
benefit. Here no form of compulsion operates on the mind of the defendant whose
decision put the character of the plaintiff in jeopardy proceeds entirely from his own
volition.
Since it is entirely of his own accord that the defendant elects to vilify the
plaintiff, justice demands that he should do so at his own peril .'..
Id. (quoting Neethling, 1994 (1) SALR at 770).
125. Id. at 603.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 613.
128. Id. at 613-16.
129. Id. at 613-14.
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of a private party, into a State political weapon to intimidate the press.' ,,130
Because defamation awards were much smaller in South Africa than in New
York, the danger that the State in South
Africa would use such an action to
31
stifle the press was much smaller.'
The Holomisa court stated that another reason New York Times should
not be followed was the difference between the United States and South
Africa in the protections that are afforded public officials.' 32 New York
Times had justified curtailing a public official's right to sue for libel on the
ground that public officials are granted immunity for defamatory statements33
made in the course of their conduct while performing official duties.
However, public officials enjoy no such immunity in South Africa.' 34
The Holomisa court, quoting S.W. Kentridge for its most significant
reservation about the New York Times standard, stated that it "'gives wholly
insufficient weight to an individual's right of reputation.' ' 3
The
Holomisa court continued, quoting Kentridge:
"A person who goes into public life must expect robust and often
unfair criticism. That is part of the price of going into public life.
But it does not follow that it is necessary to deprive him or her of
any right to reputation. There are surely some libels so gross and
offensive that they should
be publishable only on condition that they
136
are proved to be true."'

In conclusion, the Holomisa court held that the express granting of free
speech by the South African Constitution dictated that a plaintiff who seeks
to restrict political speech should bear the burden of proving that the
defendant has forfeited constitutional protection. 37 If a publisher acts
"unreasonably" in publishing statements, the publisher would then forfeit
constitutional protection. 38 This "reasonableness" standard would serve to
protect reputation, while affording constitutional protection for free speech

130. Id. at 613

(quoting ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE No LAW - The Sullivan CASE AND THE

FIRST AMENDMENT 35 (1991). As justification for this rationale, the Holomisa court noted
that by the time of the New York Times action, Southern officials had brought nearly US$300
million in libel actions against the press. Id.
131. Holomisa, 1996 (2) SALR at 614.

132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 615 (quoting S.W. Kentridge, Freedom of Speech: Is It the Primary Right?,
Lecture at the Nineteenth F.A. Mann Lecture (Oct. 18, 1995)).
136. Id. (quoting Kentridge, supra note 135).
137. Id. at 617.
138. Id.
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and expression. 139 Finally, summarizing the new defamation law in South
Africa, the Holomisa court held that "a defamatory statement which relates
to 'free and fair political activity is constitutionally protected, even if false,
unless the plaintiff shows that, in all the circumstances of its publication, it
was unreasonably made.' 11140
V.

THE EFFECT OF THE AUSTRALIAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN DECISIONS
ON UNITED STATES DEFAMATION LAW

On their faces, the Theophanous and Holomisa decisions appear to make
sense. They both address concerns that have been raised about the New York
Times decision.' 4 1 However, the Australian and South African decisions
lose most of their persuasiveness under close scrutiny.
In Theophanous,42 the High Court of Australia relied on several
criticisms of the New York Times 143 decision as support for its rejection of
that standard. The High Court stated that one reason for rejecting the
standard was that the defamation defendant would suffer intrusive and
expensive discovery procedures as a result of the plaintiff's burden to prove
actual malice.'" However, this criticism fails to consider the potential
harm to defendants without such a standard. Arguably, if the burden is
placed on defendants to prove the truth of their statements, plaintiffs will
inevitably win more cases. This is because of the inherent difficulty in
proving the truth of some statements. If plaintiffs win more cases,
defendants necessarily will have to pay more damages, probably in excess of
any discovery costs they might incur under the New York Times standard.
The High Court attempted to address this argument by suggesting a cap
on damages in such cases,'45 but this argument is flawed as well. While

139. Id.
The reasonableness standard offers a powerful tool for resolving the difficulties
inherent in protecting reputation while . . . giving recognition to the role the
Constitution accords free speech .... Only due inquiry and the application of
reasonable care will mark such conduct out for protection.
Id.
140. Id. at 618.
141. For an interesting critique of the New York Times decision, see Richard A. Epstein,
Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. Cau. L. REv. 782 (1986). Epstein concludes
that "on balance, the common law rules of defamation (sensibly controlled on the question of
damages) represent a better reconciliation of the dual claims of freedom of speech and the
protection of individual reputation than does the New York Times rule that has replaced it.
... [T]he sensible constitutional conclusion is to abandon the actual malice rule in New York
Times." Id. at 817.
142. Theophanous, (1994) 182 C.L.R. at 104.
143. New York Times 1, 376 U.S. at 254.
144. Theophanous, (1994) 182 C.L.R. at 135.
145. Id.
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a cap on damages would certainly reduce the damages in an individual case,
a lower burden for plaintiffs would increase the number of actions brought
against defendants. An increase in the volume of actions would result in an
increase in discovery and other litigation costs. Under a more plaintifffriendly standard, these increased costs could well surpass any costs
defendants might suffer under the New York Times standard. If so, the
chilling effect on free speech would not be eradicated. In fact, publishers
would be as hesitant, if not more hesitant, to publish controversial material.
Justice Brennan of the High Court also stated reasons for not adopting
the New York Times standard in Australia.'" Brennan pointed out that
there is no express provision for freedom of speech in the Australian
Constitution.'4 7 While this is true, a lack of constitutional protections has
not prevented courts from creating or inferring such protections. One
example is the implied right to privacy announced by the U.S. Supreme
Court. Framers of constitutions should not be held to have provided for
every possible conflict or contingency that might arise in the future. As
every lawyer knows, some events or circumstances are impossible to foresee.
Furthermore, over a period of nearly one hundred years, attitudes, mores, and
social values change. A document expressing the views of its framers should
not be held to accurately reflect the views of individuals to whom it applies
nearly one hundred years later. Even if one were to concede that the
Australian Constitution contains no freedom of speech provision, this should
not have any bearing on U.S. defamation
law because of the First Amend4
ment of the U.S. Constitution. 1
Of the two decisions rejecting the New York imes standard, Holomisa
is more likely to have an influence on U.S. defamation law. There are two
reasons for this.
First, Holomisa was decided more recently than
Theophanous.'49 Second, the political and social circumstances immediately preceding the decisions in both New York Times and Holomisa were
arguably similar. In the early 1960s in the southern United States, there was
great racial tension. Many states in the South were attempting to prevent or
stall desegregation attempts. Similarly, in South Africa in the early 1990s,
there also was great racial tension. Apartheid was not long in the past, a new
Constitution had been adopted, and many people resented the equality now
given to Blacks. These similarities would appear to support an adoption of
the New York Times standard.

146. Id. at 159-60.
147. Id.
148. See U.S. CONST. AMEND. I. The First Amendment states, in relevant part: "Congress
shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech .... "
149. Holomisa was decided in February 1996, and Theophanous was decided in October
1994.
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However, the Holomisa court enunciated several reasons for their
rejection of New York Times standard. 5 ' These reasons, like those cited
in Theophanous, do not survive close scrutiny. The Holomisa court stated
that one reason for rejecting New York imes was the smaller defamation
awards typically awarded by South African courts. 5 ' Because of these
smaller awards, the South African government would be less likely to use a
defamation action to stifle the press.'52 This justification fails to take into
account the many other costs associated with litigation. Even though the
awards in South African defamation actions are smaller, defendants still
would incur discovery costs, lawyer fees, and loss of work time in preparing
for the case. Furthermore, in most cases, there will be the cost associated
with the damage to the reputation of the defendant as a result of having been
charged with the publication of false material. Because of these other costs
associated with a defamation action, South African officials still could use
such actions as a very effective weapon against contrary views.
Another reason given by the Holomisa court for refusing to grant
protection to speech concerning public officials was that South African public
officials enjoy no corresponding protection themselves.'5 3 Although true,
this is not an acceptable justification for the rejection of the New York Times
standard. Public officials are in a position to exert power and influence over
those they govern. One inherent danger of this power is the abuse and
oppression of the governed. A protection such as that granted in New York
Times serves as a check, which can be used by the governed against potential
abuse. Public officials do not need a rule to protect against potential abuses
because the governed are not in a position to exert power or influence over
them. Thus, this is not a valid justification for rejection of the New York
Times standard.
The final reason enunciated by the Holomisa court for rejecting New
York Times was that "'some libels [are surely] so gross and offensive that
they should be publishable only on condition that they are proved to be
true."" 54 Arguably, the New York Times standard still would offer
protection against such publications. If the libels are indeed gross, offensive,
and untrue, plaintiffs under New York Times still have a good chance of
winning their cases. The more gross or offensive the published statements,
the easier it is for plaintiffs to argue that the defendant knew or should have
known of their falsity. If, however, the gross and offensive statements are
true, the public has a right to be informed. Simply to say that because

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

See supra text accompanying notes 127-33.
Holomisa, 1996 (2) SALR at 614.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 615 (quoting Kentridge, supra note 135).
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statements are gross or offensive they should be proven true before being
published is not a valid reason to reject the New York Times standard.
The reasons for the rejection of the New York Times standard that were
enunciated in the Holomisa court do not withstand scrutiny. Granted, the
political systems and histories of the United States and South Africa do
contain some common elements; therefore, the Holomisa decision should be
considered closely in light of current defamation law in the United States.
However, because the Holomisa decision is based on inaccurate assumptions
and faulty reasoning, it should have no bearing on defamation law in the
United States.
Notwithstanding Theophanousand Holomisa, the recent emergence of the
internet may provide support for critics of the New York Times standard.
Because of the proliferation of web sites throughout the world, vast amounts
of information may be disseminated to millions of sites within a matter of
seconds. Proponents of a more plaintiff-friendly rule might argue that today
a plaintiff can be defamed on a greater scale than in 1964 when New York
Times was decided. Furthermore, due to the potential for greater harm,
plaintiffs today should have a lower burden of proof in defamation actions.
This argument, however, proves too much. Arguably, as more people are
exposed to this type of damaging information, they will become more
accustomed to it. After continued exposure, an audience tends to become
desensitized to the information. As more and more claims are proven to be
untrue, the audience becomes skeptical of the information, and thus, the
damage to plaintiffs is decreased or becomes nonexistent. Additionally, new
electronic mediums, such as the internet, are relatively inexpensive and
available to anyone, thus allowing plaintiffs to respond immediately,
worldwide to defamatory remarks.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The two recent decisions out of Australia and South Africa that rejected
the actual malice standard set forth in New York Times should be examined
closely. Because New York Times has been widely criticized and is more
than thirty years old, it should be examined as well to insure that it is still
appropriate today. Upon examination of all three decisions, I conclude that
New York Times was a valid decision, that it is an appropriate standard today,
and that the decisions out of Australia and South Africa leave publishers
subject to many of the evils that the actual malice standard of New York
Times was designed to protect against.
As has been discussed in this note, the Theophanous standard does not
provide adequate protections to publishers. By requiring the publisher to
prove that it acted reasonably, that is, it took some measures to check the
accuracy of the impugned material or was justified in publishing the material
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol10/iss2/5
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without taking such steps, the Theophanous standard allows the opportunity
for abuse of defamation actions by public officials. Juries are free to assess
huge damage awards against the press, publishers are subject to intrusive and
expensive discovery costs, and political discussion necessarily can be
curtailed. Because of the unique history of the United States, including past
abuses of the system in an attempt to curtail the free speech of the press, it
is doubtful that the Theophanous court's rejection of the actual malice
standard of New York Times will have any impact on U.S. defamation law.
The decision of the Holomisa court deserves more attention because of
the similarity between South Africa's racial unrest and that of pre-New York
Times United States. One could postulate that in light of the history of South
Africa, the Holomisa court should be concerned with the possibility of abuse
that a more plaintiff-friendly standard than the actual malice standard would
create. Instead, Holomisa merely requires a plaintiff to show that the
defamatory statements were "unreasonably" published. While this standard
makes it slightly harder for a plaintiff to prevail in a defamation action than
does the Theophanous standard, it still does not go far enough. Under
Holomisa,juries are still able to easily decide that a defamation has occurred
and award large damages. Furthermore, publishers still are subject to
extensive discovery procedures. Given the history of oppression and
discrimination in South Africa, one would think the Holomisa court would
embrace New York Times. But for wholly inadequate reasons, the actual
malice standard was rejected. Because of the unsoundness of the Holomisa
decision, it will have a negligible impact on U.S. defamation law and most
likely will be viewed as an aberration.
The actual malice standard set forth in New York Times was a sound
decision. It was good law then and remains the standard today, more than
thirty years later. The decision will continue to stand for many more years
into the future, Theophanous and Holomisa notwithstanding.
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